Rush Doshi’s new book, “The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order“, is an in-depth study of what has brought China to where it is today, and what it plans to do in the short to medium term to take over America’s leadership role in the world.
It’s not light or easy reading, but it’s very informative. There’s perhaps no single factor likely to affect geopolitics and international relationships over the next century or so as important as China and its policies. The sheer mass of its population, its economic clout, and its growing military presence – already equalling that of the USA in Asia, and likely to exceed it in the short term – makes that a certainty. The next decade will be critical in determining how that works out over the rest of the 21st century.
Here’s part of the Introduction from the book, summarizing its approach and laying the foundation for its analysis.
It was 1872, and Li Hongzhang was writing at a time of historic upheaval. A Qing Dynasty general and official who dedicated much of his life to reforming a dying empire, Li was often compared to his contemporary Otto von Bismarck, the architect of German unification and national power whose portrait Li was said to keep for inspiration.
Like Bismarck, Li had military experience that he parlayed into considerable influence, including over foreign and military policy. He had been instrumental in putting down the fourteen-year Taiping rebellion—the bloodiest conflict of the entire nineteenth century—which had seen a millenarian Christian state rise from the growing vacuum of Qing authority to launch a civil war that claimed tens of millions of lives. This campaign against the rebels provided Li with an appreciation for Western weapons and technology, a fear of European and Japanese predations, a commitment to Chinese self-strengthening and modernization—and critically—the influence and prestige to do something about it.
And so it was in 1872 that in one of his many correspondences, Li reflected on the groundbreaking geopolitical and technological transformations he had seen in his own life that posed an existential threat to the Qing. In a memorandum advocating for more investment in Chinese shipbuilding, he penned a line since repeated for generations: China was experiencing “great changes not seen in three thousand years.”
That famous, sweeping statement is to many Chinese nationalists a reminder of the country’s own humiliation. Li ultimately failed to modernize China, lost a war to Japan, and signed the embarrassing Treaty of Shimonoseki with Tokyo. But to many, Li’s line was both prescient and accurate—China’s decline was the product of the Qing Dynasty’s inability to reckon with transformative geopolitical and technological forces that had not been seen for three thousand years, forces which changed the international balance of power and ushered in China’s “Century of Humiliation.” These were trends that all of Li’s striving could not reverse.
Now, Li’s line has been repurposed by China’s leader Xi Jinping to inaugurate a new phase in China’s post–Cold War grand strategy. Since 2017, Xi has in many of the country’s critical foreign policy addresses declared that the world is in the midst of “great changes unseen in a century” [百年未有之大变局]. If Li’s line marks the highpoint of China’s humiliation, then Xi’s marks an occasion for its rejuvenation. If Li’s evokes tragedy, then Xi’s evokes opportunity. But both capture something essential: the idea that world order is once again at stake because of unprecedented geopolitical and technological shifts, and that this requires strategic adjustment.
For Xi, the origin of these shifts is China’s growing power and what it saw as the West’s apparent self-destruction. On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. Then, a little more than three months later, a populist surge catapulted Donald Trump into office as president of the United States. From China’s perspective—which is highly sensitive to changes in its perceptions of American power and threat—these two events were shocking. Beijing believed that the world’s most powerful democracies were withdrawing from the international order they had helped erect abroad and were struggling to govern themselves at home. The West’s subsequent response to the coronavirus pandemic in 2020, and then the storming of the US Capitol by extremists in 2021, reinforced a sense that “time and momentum are on our side,” as Xi Jinping put it shortly after those events. China’s leadership and foreign policy elite declared that a “period of historical opportunity” [历史机遇期] had emerged to expand the country’s strategic focus from Asia to the wider globe and its governance systems.
We are now in the early years of what comes next—a China that not only seeks regional influence as so many great powers do, but as Evan Osnos has argued, “that is preparing to shape the twenty-first century, much as the U.S. shaped the twentieth.” That competition for influence will be a global one, and Beijing believes with good reason that the next decade will likely determine the outcome.
As we enter this new stretch of acute competition, we lack answers to critical foundational questions. What are China’s ambitions, and does it have a grand strategy to achieve them? If it does, what is that strategy, what shapes it, and what should the United States do about it? These are basic questions for American policymakers grappling with this century’s greatest geopolitical challenge, not least because knowing an opponent’s strategy is the first step to countering it. And yet, as great power tensions flare, there is no consensus on the answers.
This book attempts to provide an answer. In its argument and structure, the book takes its inspiration in part from Cold War studies of US grand strategy. Where those works analyzed the theory and practice of US “strategies of containment” toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War, this book seeks to analyze the theory and practice of China’s “strategies of displacement” toward the United States after the Cold War.
To do so, the book makes use of an original database of Chinese Communist Party documents—memoirs, biographies, and daily records of senior officials—painstakingly gathered and then digitized over the last several years from libraries, bookstores in Taiwan and Hong Kong, and Chinese e-commerce sites (see Appendix). Many of the documents take readers behind the closed doors of the Chinese Communist Party, bring them into its high-level foreign policy institutions and meetings, and introduce readers to a wide cast of Chinese political leaders, generals, and diplomats charged with devising and implementing China’s grand strategy. While no one master document contains all of Chinese grand strategy, its outline can be found across a wide corpus of texts. Within them, the Party uses hierarchical statements that represent internal consensus on key issues to guide the ship of state, and these statements can be traced across time. The most important of these is the Party line (路线), then the guideline (方针), and finally the policy (政策), among other terms. Understanding them sometimes requires proficiency not only in Chinese, but also in seemingly impenetrable and archaic ideological concepts like “dialectical unities” and “historical materialism.”
Argument in Brief
The book argues that the core of US-China competition since the Cold War has been over regional and now global order. It focuses on the strategies that rising powers like China use to displace an established hegemon like the United States short of war. A hegemon’s position in regional and global order emerges from three broad “forms of control” that are used to regulate the behavior of other states: coercive capability (to force compliance), consensual inducements (to incentivize it), and legitimacy (to rightfully command it). For rising states, the act of peacefully displacing the hegemon consists of two broad strategies generally pursued in sequence. The first strategy is to blunt the hegemon’s exercise of those forms of control, particularly those extended over the rising state; after all, no rising state can displace the hegemon if it remains at the hegemon’s mercy. The second is to build forms of control over others; indeed, no rising state can become a hegemon if it cannot secure the deference of other states through coercive threats, consensual inducements, or rightful legitimacy. Unless a rising power has first blunted the hegemon, efforts to build order are likely to be futile and easily opposed. And until a rising power has successfully conducted a good degree of blunting and building in its home region, it remains too vulnerable to the hegemon’s influence to confidently turn to a third strategy, global expansion, which pursues both blunting and building at the global level to displace the hegemon from international leadership. Together, these strategies at the regional and then global levels provide a rough means of ascent for the Chinese Communist Party’s nationalist elites, who seek to restore China to its due place and roll back the historical aberration of the West’s overwhelming global influence.
This is a template China has followed, and in its review of China’s strategies of displacement, the book argues that shifts from one strategy to the next have been triggered by sharp discontinuities in the most important variable shaping Chinese grand strategy: its perception of US power and threat. China’s first strategy of displacement (1989–2008) was to quietly blunt American power over China, particularly in Asia, and it emerged after the traumatic trifecta of Tiananmen Square, the Gulf War, and the Soviet collapse led Beijing to sharply increase its perception of US threat. China’s second strategy of displacement (2008–2016) sought to build the foundation for regional hegemony in Asia, and it was launched after the Global Financial Crisis led Beijing to see US power as diminished and emboldened it to take a more confident approach. Now, with the invocation of “great changes unseen in a century” following Brexit, President Trump’s election, and the coronavirus pandemic, China is launching a third strategy of displacement, one that expands its blunting and building efforts worldwide to displace the United States as the global leader. In its final chapters, this book uses insights about China’s strategy to formulate an asymmetric US grand strategy in response—one that takes a page from China’s own book—and would seek to contest China’s regional and global ambitions without competing dollar-for-dollar, ship-for-ship, or loan-for-loan.
The book also illustrates what Chinese order might look like if China is able to achieve its goal of “national rejuvenation” by the centennial of the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 2049. At the regional level, China already accounts for more than half of Asian GDP and half of all Asian military spending, which is pushing the region out of balance and toward a Chinese sphere of influence. A fully realized Chinese order might eventually involve the withdrawal of US forces from Japan and Korea, the end of American regional alliances, the effective removal of the US Navy from the Western Pacific, deference from China’s regional neighbors, unification with Taiwan, and the resolution of territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. Chinese order would likely be more coercive than the present order, consensual in ways that primarily benefit connected elites even at the expense of voting publics, and considered legitimate mostly to those few who it directly rewards. China would deploy this order in ways that damage liberal values, with authoritarian winds blowing stronger across the region. Order abroad is often a reflection of order at home, and China’s order-building would be distinctly illiberal relative to US order-building.
At the global level, Chinese order would involve seizing the opportunities of the “great changes unseen in a century” and displacing the United States as the world’s leading state. This would require successfully managing the principal risk flowing from the “great changes”—Washington’s unwillingness to gracefully accept decline—by weakening the forms of control supporting American global order while strengthening those forms of control supporting a Chinese alternative. That order would span a “zone of super-ordinate influence” in Asia as well as “partial hegemony” in swaths of the developing world that might gradually expand to encompass the world’s industrialized centers—a vision some Chinese popular writers describe using Mao’s revolutionary guidance to “surround the cities from the countryside” [农村包围城市]. More authoritative sources put this approach in less sweeping terms, suggesting Chinese order would be anchored in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its Community of Common Destiny, with the former in particular creating networks of coercive capability, consensual inducement, and legitimacy.
Some of the strategy to achieve this global order is already discernable in Xi’s speeches. Politically, Beijing would project leadership over global governance and international institutions, split Western alliances, and advance autocratic norms at the expense of liberal ones. Economically, it would weaken the financial advantages that underwrite US hegemony and seize the commanding heights of the “fourth industrial revolution” from artificial intelligence to quantum computing, with the United States declining into a “deindustrialized, English-speaking version of a Latin American republic, specializing in commodities, real estate, tourism, and perhaps transnational tax evasion.” Militarily, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would field a world-class force with bases around the world that could defend China’s interests in most regions and even in new domains like space, the poles, and the deep sea. The fact that aspects of this vision are visible in high-level speeches is strong evidence that China’s ambitions are not limited to Taiwan or to dominating the Indo-Pacific. The “struggle for mastery,” once confined to Asia, is now over the global order and its future. If there are two paths to hegemony—a regional one and a global one—China is now pursuing both.
This glimpse at possible Chinese order maybe striking, but it should not be surprising. Over a decade ago, Lee Kuan Yew—the visionary politician who built modern Singapore and personally knew China’s top leaders—was asked by an interviewer, “Are Chinese leaders serious about displacing the United States as the number one power in Asia and in the world?” He answered with an emphatic yes. “Of course. Why not?” he began, “They have transformed a poor society by an economic miracle to become now the second-largest economy in the world—on track . . . to become the world’s largest economy.” China, he continued, boasts “a culture 4,000 years old with 1.3 billion people, with a huge and very talented pool to draw from. How could they not aspire to be number one in Asia, and in time the world?” China was “growing at rates unimaginable 50 years ago, a dramatic transformation no one predicted,” he observed, and “every Chinese wants a strong and rich China, a nation as prosperous, advanced, and technologically competent as America, Europe, and Japan.” He closed his answer with a key insight: “This reawakened sense of destiny is an overpowering force. . . . China wants to be China and accepted as such, not as an honorary member of the West.” China might want to “share this century” with the United States, perhaps as “co-equals,” he noted, but certainly not as subordinates.
Why Grand Strategy Matters
The need for a grounded understanding of China’s intentions and strategy has never been more urgent. China now poses a challenge unlike any the United States has ever faced. For more than a century, no US adversary or coalition of adversaries has reached 60 percent of US GDP. Neither Wilhelmine Germany during the First World War, the combined might of Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany during the Second World War, nor the Soviet Union at the height of its economic power ever crossed this threshold. And yet, this is a milestone that China itself quietly reached as early as 2014. When one adjusts for the relative price of goods, China’s economy is already 25 percent larger than the US economy. It is clear, then, that China is the most significant competitor that the United States has faced and that the way Washington handles its emergence to superpower status will shape the course of the next century.
What is less clear, at least in Washington, is whether China has a grand strategy and what it might be. This book defines grand strategy as a state’s theory of how it can achieve its strategic objectives that is intentional, coordinated, and implemented across multiple means of statecraft—military, economic, and political. What makes grand strategy “grand” is not simply the size of the strategic objectives but also the fact that disparate “means” are coordinated together to achieve it. That kind of coordination is rare, and most great powers consequently do not have a grand strategy.
When states do have grand strategies, however, they can reshape world history. Nazi Germany wielded a grand strategy that used economic tools to constrain its neighbors, military buildups to intimidate its rivals, and political alignments to encircle its adversaries—allowing it to outperform its great power competitors for a considerable time even though its GDP was less than one-third theirs. During the Cold War, Washington pursued a grand strategy that at times used military power to deter Soviet aggression, economic aid to curtail communist influence, and political institutions to bind liberal states together—limiting Soviet influence without a US-Soviet war. How China similarly integrates its instruments of statecraft in pursuit of overarching regional and global objectives remains an area that has received abundant speculation but little rigorous study despite its enormous consequences. The coordination and long-term planning involved in grand strategy allow a state to punch above its weight; since China is already a heavyweight, if it has a coherent scheme that coordinates its $14 trillion economy with its blue-water navy and rising political influence around the world—and the United States either misses it or misunderstands it—the course of the twenty-first century may unfold in ways detrimental to the United States and the liberal values it has long championed.
Washington is belatedly coming to terms with this reality, and the result is the most consequential reassessment of its China policy in over a generation. And yet, amid this reassessment, there is wide-ranging disagreement over what China wants and where it is going. Some believe Beijing has global ambitions; others argue that its focus is largely regional. Some claim it has a coordinated 100-year plan; others that it is opportunistic and error-prone. Some label Beijing a boldly revisionist power; others see it as a sober-minded stakeholder of the current order. Some say Beijing wants the United States out of Asia; and others that it tolerates a modest US role. Where analysts increasingly agree is on the idea that China’s recent assertiveness is a product of Chinese President Xi’s personality—a mistaken notion that ignores the long-standing Party consensus in which China’s behavior is actually rooted. The fact that the contemporary debate remains divided on so many fundamental questions related to China’s grand strategy—and inaccurate even in its major areas of agreement—is troubling, especially since each question holds wildly different policy implications.
Like it or not, the USA is already overmatched by China in Asia and Africa, and may well become the same in South America before long. We’re investing most of our economic substance in domestic concerns, whereas China is devoting trillions of dollars to securing resources overseas and buying influence and favor in foreign capitals. The cumulative effect is unlikely to be favorable to US interests.
This book provides a useful summary of where we are, and attempts to postulate a road ahead for China. How we respond to that will, in large measure, determine whether or not the USA remains a “Great Power” at all, or sinks into decline the way the other “Great Powers” of the World War II era and before have done.
I comment a lot on another blog and every time China comes up, still get the usual litany of ‘Goddamn Communist Chinky Bastards keep copying all our IP’
Americans are still mostly hopelessly ignorant about China. Joe Public has no idea what Shenzhen or Shanghai looks like and no idea that his country now can’t manufacture an iPhone for all the (err) Tea in China. Come to think of it Joe Public has no notion of modern clean subways and high speed bullet trains not full of chimping out Diversity and screaming schizophrenic homeless hobos.
Of course they copy your IP. You can’t stop them, so they do. There is no ‘Fair’ in the great game of global domination.
Well they’ve got Quantum Computers, pretty much dominate global 5G infrastructure rollout, and just launched another space station. They’ll have a moon base before the USA because NASA will be busy with internal purges and running all their calculations past black trannies.
And enough of this Communism nonsense. They have what looks like an Emperor but is probably closer to the Doge of Venice given the way he gets chosen. Under him is a vast Leninist governing machine — and may I remind you all that Chiang Kai Shek’s KMT was also a party run on strictly Leninist lines. In 2021 the CCP is about as communist a party as the Republican Party is, well, Republican (it is to laugh).
The only way they don’t pull off the Global Hegemon trick (and I think they’d probably rule with a less heavy hand than US has done) is if they jump the gun too early through hubris, or accident, or through domestic instability requiring foreign adventures to distract public and let off steam.
Hubris I think not. You don’t make it to the top of that greasy pole by anything other than playing your cards very cautiously and taking the long view. Bo Xilai thought otherwise and will die in his luxury prison for that mistake.
American History will have some unkind things to say about the folks who blew the chance to build an alliance with the Russians but did the opposite for ancestral atavistic reasons.
Again, Jinping is a modern-day Mao who wants to take the Great Leap Forward on a global scale. And he'll probably succeed.
Slightly related: the calls for "vaccine" mandates are growing louder.
Is there any legal recourse to this?
It seems to me that American dominance in the twentieth century was by-and-large accidental, or at least a mere by-product rather than an intentional design. Recall that there was great opposition to our involvement in WW I which Wilson's Princeton-cultivated globalism (and racist jingoism to boot) fostered. Despite (or perhaps because of) that experience, America largely withdrew within its own borders over the next thirty years, until forced to abandon its isolationist tendencies under Roosevelt. The Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor precipitated our subsequent ascent into the world hegemon we became. Notwithstanding that, a large segment of our people is still isolationist at heart; it only supports our extra-territorial adventures when its leaders demand it as a patriotic exercise. Hence, John Foster Dulles et al.'s crusade against communism. (That actually may be regarded as worthwhile, but I'm pretty ambivalent about that, judging by what it has led to.) Contrast China, which has a three thousand year history of isolationism which its current leaders are intent upon changing, and who may yet be successful on account of China's other historical underpinning of autocratic rule. As an aside, in addition to bringing the US into WW II, we can thank the Japanese for creating the Chinese communist party. So, nuked too much or not enough remains the eternal question.
China does have two major weaknesses…Lack of creativity caused by millennia of Darwinian pressure to conform at all costs, and inadequate food production which is only getting worse…Both are exploitable, in the event that American politicians ever stop being well bribed puppets of China…
Also, China is in a negative population growth curve for now the second generation, due to the one male child manifesto. That is forcing them to 'accelerate' their plan.
The PRC's efforts to expand into other nation's markets offers as many opportunities to counter CCP expansionism externally and internally as there are distinct expansion projects negotiated by China. Each separate country is an opportunity to penetrate internal PRC markets and institutions, as well as an opportunity to increase the difficulty/expense of CCP expansion efforts within the host country. Both of which work to undermine Emperor Xi's domestic and international political influence. China is not a unified polity; rather, it is the interplay of dynamic and competitive interests within the CCP structure that those interests continue to find useful for the time being. Xi's skill is in his ability to play those differing interests off against one another by exploiting the CCP ideology to his advantage while doing so. Adding internal and external stress to that process in a plausibly deniable manner can only work to the advantage of the CCP's ideological opponents.
Would there were only some effort being expended to take advantage of all these opportunities the PRC must continue to provide their potential opponents, lest their internal markets catastrophically collapse and domestic revolution become widespread. Also, given the domestic prestige of service in the PLA (PLAN/AF) within the CCP membership, along with the inevitable results of the one-child policy, means that any active war Xi allows the country to become embroiled in will inevitably result in the deaths of an overwhelming number of CCP member children – virtually all of whom are the sole hope for familial longevity. Any war would decimate Xi's political support within the CCP, itself a path to internal revolution within the PRC.
It seems obvious that now is the time to confront Xi Jinping and the CCP leadership in as many ways as possible, before a generational repair of Chinese demographics can occur or they are able to more fully implement their expansionist activities internationally.
In order for the US to competently and comprehensively respond to the growth of Chinese power and influence overseas, it will first need to reach (minimally) a détente in terms of the ideological and cultural war it is in. Until the vast portion of the citizenry is convinced that Chinese influence is more of a threat than what another internal US citizen believes, we can and will do nothing. Given a long enough time of that, the winners of that internal war will turn their gaze to the outside only to find the are best a second or third rate power, deeply in debt and (quite likely) having little to offer the world.
Some good points and there’s always the chance for some Judo moves on your opponent when your interests are intertwined but both of you have differing strengths and weaknesses. Now who do you think has a political leadership which groks this and who do you think has a political culture full of corrupt asset-stripping oligarchs’ puppets with a time horizon of tomorrow midday?
Penetrate Chinese Institutions? Don’t make me laugh. Who is going to do that? ‘Chinese Americans’? 😀 Jaysus wept. Sorry, Old Chap… but that’s a hope and a dream and a Cope. You don’t ‘penetrate’ the power and security institutions of a mono racial society…. They use your Diversity Achilles Hell to penetrate yours. We in the West are well past being China’s ‘Three Holer’ — More like their rerun of the Mongolian ‘Cluster#%^&’.
Situation is dire. But there are worse things than being a global irrelevance or a far-flung loosely run satrapy: It’s far worse to be having your accumulated capital and social capital of generations strip-mined by alien elites with no true allegiance to your blood and soil and deracinated WASP remnants. Selling what remains to China means nothing to them. They’ll still have good lives.
It’s going to have to be a long game to counter multiple long games (only one of which is Chinese). Domestic spring cleaning will take generations and likely won’t happen except the hard way. Them’s the breaks.
Gentlemen COVID 19 was a Bioweapon jointly created by the Chinese and Funded by our OWN Dr. Fauci by his own email evidence. WE FUNDED that Lab…
It was released to "infect" the world at the VERY BEST Time at Chinese New Years where EVERY Rich Chinese was to fly around the world visiting their families and children studying abroad. CONGRESS Forbade Trump's attempts to STOP ALL flights from China as Racist or something. THUS Guaranteeing WE the People would get this Chinese Gift.
Giving the Chinese some deniability as They "Suffered" first from this disaster. Not that a few 10's of thousands of Chinese losses means that much to the Chinese Communist Party. Would have been Interesting IF Any Member of the CCP leadership ever got "sick" from this.
Much like Pelosi and Co WHO has GOTTEN this "Uncontrolled Plague"? MINOR Democrat Staffers and several Republican Senators and Congressmen eh? Rand Paul, President Trump ring a bell??? EVERYBODY is exposed but odd who GETS the Plague eh?
Joe Biden and most of the Socialist-Democrats are IN THE PAY of China.
WE were SOLD down the river by the Deep State (you know the 3 letter agencies that are Supposed to PROTECT the USA from such evils) and the Chinese GAVE the USA to THEM as a Satrap.
Please LOOK UP Satrap. Chilling but something China USED in it's own history with neighboring countries. A limited version is Belt and Road ONWERSHIP by debt of various "allies".
The Chinese no doubt have neutralized our Nukes lest a rogue element use them and as mentioned above look how China's President Xi WINS with this?
Their greatest threat is Bought lock stock and barrel. THEY Control OUR Military through LEGAL Orders from our own Military Chain of Command.
They DON'T have to Fight us, just "Allowing" harsh Words between their OWNED Satrap and China GIVES Xi something to control His internal issues.
No massive warfare to ill off his LIMITED Population issues mentioned above.
Indeed President Xi can have HIS Satrap FIGHT small wars FOR China's benefit.
Prepare for a combination of Hunger Games and Orville's 1984. Satrapy at it's finest in those two novels.
Sorry noticed my spelling errors after I hit submit.
But look at the Who Benefited from COVID? Could the Democrats successfully pull off such a massive fraud with out "COVID" Safety Restrictions and uncontrolled mail in and faked ballots?
Who Own the Military right now? The Traditionalist Republican leaning or the Woke?
What they are doing is line by line from Mao's little Red Book including the Destruction of the 4 OLDS.
History is being destroyed and rewritten just like Orville's 1894 as all Canceled by the Woke Mob who are the RED Guard of America.
Pray for wisdom on how to protect your family from being canceled or forced to submit to the woke Red Guard.
This really parallels what my research has shown. The external work that China is doing is near a turning point that will lead to really significant economic upheaval as the world economic leadership has consequences and benefits.
It looks like an interesting book, this one. The fact that the text is willing to resort to quoting at least some things in the original Chinese text inclines me to take it seriously.
I notice that there are a couple of reviews of it by Amazon customers that suggest that it may be too academic in nature, that is to say, too removed from boots-on-the-ground knowledge of today's China. What do you make of that criticism of this book in particular?
@Genji, it is an interesting point about alliance with Russia. Given the patterns of the strategic politics of the latter twentieth century, it would seem natural at this point, if that context were to be maintained, that we and Russia should have been thinking about teaming up right about now. How did it happen otherwise? And is it too late to (to use a really atrociously tired phrase) hit the reset with the Russian Federation? "Ancestral atavistic reasons"… are you thinking of German-Russian tensions over the centuries being extrapolated to US-Russian ones, for example? Maybe some of the threads in NATO's ideological heritage?
Well, I don't want to distract this thread too much, since we are supposed to be talking about China here. 🙂
In WW I, the German General Staff transported one V. I. Lenin to Czarist Russia in a sealed railway carriage, hoping that the insertion of a revolutionary would weaken their adversary.
That worked out rather too well :/
On the other hand, Catherine the Great was German and I believe is still fondly remembered in Russia …
The U.S. and Russia cannot become allies, their interests are too divergent. However, a more pragmatic U.S. policy would recognize a fait accompli such as annexation of Crimea, moving on to focus on cooperation where it is mutually beneficial.
Peter could you check your spam folder please? Yesterday morning I posted a comment that included a link to a highly relevant (in my humble opinion) article by Michael Thau on Substack. The headline of the article is "When Are We Going to Start Questioning THE REST of China's COVID-19 Narrative?"
@froginblender: No sign of that earlier comment. Blogger sometimes does that to comments at random – loses them before they post. Try re-submitting it.
OK trying again … the link to Thau's article on Substack is https://michaelthau.substack.com/p/when-are-we-going-to-start-questioning
A few choice quotes:
— "… rebranding a brutal tool of subjugation like lockdowns into a cutting-edge public health strategy wasn’t easy. The CCP had to conduct a systematic propaganda campaign that involved co-opting every source of authority we had."
— "The only evidence we had that lockdowns would bring any benefits to counterbalance the obvious horrific costs our public health officials were pretending didn’t even exist depended on taking the CCP’s word on faith."
— "Peru, on the other hand, imposed the harshest lockdowns in the world yet somehow also wound up with its highest COVID death rate. Nobody else was even close."
– "China co-opted our scientists and academics to help push America into suicidal policies without a shred of scientific justification outside of their own untrustworthy word. They also directed blatant propaganda at the American people."
— "The CCP, as well as public health officials like Anthony Fauci and Robert Redfield, had to know that depriving our frail and elderly nursing home residents of all human companionship and leaving them with just the TV terrorizing them 24/7 about a deadly virus wiping out humanity was bound to kill many already hanging on by just a slim thread.
Think of what it was like.
The few staff members who became their sole link to humanity stayed away as much as possible. When they did appear, they wore masks and gloves and avoided getting close as much as possible, in a contagious state of dread themselves.
And that finishing touch of terror was added even though literally dozens of research studies made it impossible that wearing masks would do a damned thing to stop a respiratory virus.
For how many were weekly visits by family, friends, or even mere strangers kindly volunteering to relieve the loneliest among us of that awful burden the only thing sustaining life?
China’s prescription also meant locking nursing home residents up inside with recirculated air, giving aerosol particles carrying any ordinary pathogens infecting sick fellow inmates more of a chance to infect them.
The CCP’s homicidal advice turned our nursing homes into literal death camps."